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Constitutional Law 
by James E. Leahy* 
Restrictions on the political activities of public employees 
and the application of the statutory ban on obscenity were 
some of the First Amendment problems presented to the Cali-
fornia appellate courts this past year. 
Due process also received some attention. The courts 
were faced with such diverse questions as the regulation of 
insurance companies doing business in California exclusively 
by mail, the right to a hearing when the government takes 
action against an individual, and the taxation of foreign-based 
aircraft that fly into, out of, and within California. 
Reapportionment of an irrigation district, license taxes, and 
payment for care of a patient at a state mental institution were 
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among the problems in the realm of equal protection that 
confronted the courts. 
Bagley and Its Aftermath 
FIRST AMENDMENT-Political Rights of Public Employ-
ees Upheld 
Twice during the past year, the California Supreme Court 
reexamined the validity of restrictions on political activities 
of public employees. The first occasion was Bagley v. Wash-
ington Township Hospital District,l which involved the dis-
charge of a nurse's aide for participating in a movement to 
recall certain directors of the hospital district by which she 
was employed. She had been hired by the hospital district 
as a nurse's aide in April, 1960. The record showed that she 
consistently performed her assigned duties to the complete 
satisfaction of her superiors. Late in 1963 a number of citi-
zens had become dissatisfied with the policies of the hospital 
district and commenced a recall campaign against certain of 
its directors. During her off-duty hours, the nurse's aide par-
ticipated in the activities of this group. In February, 1964, 
the hospital administrator issued to all hospital personnel a 
memo entitled "Political Activities of Public Employees," 
which stated that participation in political activity by employ-
ees, for or against any candidate or ballot measure pertaining 
to the district, was unlawful and constituted grounds for dis-
missal. The nurse's aide was called into the hospital admin-
istrator's office and asked if she had discontinued her activity 
in the recall movement. When she replied negatively, her 
employment was terminated. She thereupon brought suit 
against the hospital, seeking reinstatement, back wages, and 
damages. 
The second occasion, Rosenfield v. Malcolm,2 involved a 
doctor employed as an assistant district health officer. While 
employed by the county, and before attaining civil service 
status, the doctor became associated with an organization 
calling itself the Ad Hoc Committee to End Discrimination. 
1. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 2. 65 Cal.2d 559, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505, 
421 P.2d 409 (1966). 421 P.2d 697 (1967). 
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The county advised him that his continued membership in 
this organization was incompatible with his employment as 
a health officer. He indicated his willingness to cease active 
participation in the committee, but he refused to completely 
sever his connection with the organization, and was thereupon 
discharged. 
In both these cases the court held that dismissal violated 
the constitutional rights of the employees as guaranteed by 
the First Amendment. The court set forth the basis for both 
decisions by stating its holding in Bagley: 
[W]e hold that a governmental agency which would 
require a waiver of constitutional rights as a condition 
of public employment must demonstrate: (1) that the 
political restraints rationally relate to the enhancement 
of the public service, (2) that the benefits which the 
public gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting im-
pairment of constitutional rights, and (3) that no alter-
natives less subversive of constitutional rights are avail-
able.s 
While the Bagley decision is not one of first impression in 
California, it is the first time the court has so clearly spelled 
out the standards by which governmental action will hereafter 
be measured. 
Pointing toward the result in these two cases was Fort v. 
Civil Service Commission,4 which concerned the application 
of a section of the charter of Alameda County. This section 
prohibited any 
person holding a position in the classified civil service 
[from taking] part in political management or 
affairs in any political campaign or in any 
campaign to adopt or reject any initiative or referendum 
measure. 5 
3. 65 Cal.2d at 501-502, 55 Cal. 5. 61 Cal.2d at 333, 38 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 403, 421 P.2d at 411. at 626, 392 P.2d at 386. 
4. 61 Cal.2d 331, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 
392 P.2d 385 (1964). 
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The plaintiff, an employee of Alameda County, had become 
associated with a political campaign and was dismissed for 
that reason. Although recognizing that one employed in 
public service does not have a constitutional right to such em-
ployment, the Calfornia Supreme Court pointed out that a 
"person cannot properly be barred or removed from public 
employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional 
rights.,,6 The court made a a thorough analysis of pertinent 
California and United States Supreme Court decisions and 
concluded: 
The principles set forth in the recent decisions do not 
admit of wholesale restrictions on political activities 
merely because the persons affected are public employ-
ees, particularly when it is considered that there are 
millions of such persons. It must appear that restric-
tions imposed by a governmental entity are not broader 
than are required to preserve the efficiency and integrity 
of its public service.7 (Emphasis added.) 
No standards were expressly set forth in Fort except the 
standard emphasized above. However, the court implied that 
there must be some showing of a compelling public need 
to sustain provisions as broad as the one in question. No 
such compelling need had been shown. 
The Bagley opinion uses Fort as a starting point. The 
court goes on to point out that a government may legitimately 
withhold benefits from its citizens. But this does not mean 
that when benefits are granted they can be granted on an 
arbitrary deprivation of constitutional rights. Once it is rec-
ognized that public employment does not deprive the employee 
of constitutional protection, one has a starting point from 
which restrictions on his rights can be scrutinized. Although 
it might be argued that because certain rights are stated in 
absolute terms in the Bill of Rights, they are absolute,S it is 
clear that they are not always so treated. Even the cherished 
6. 61 Cal.2d at 334, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 
627, 392 P.2d at 387. 
7. 61 Cal.2d at 337-338, 38 Cal. 
Rptr. at 629, 392 P.2d at 389. 
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rights guaranteed by the First Amendment have been sub-
jected to restriction when there was an overriding, compelling 
public need.9 
The adoption by the United States Supreme Court of the 
position that constitutional rights are not absolute presents 
state courts with the problem of devising some standard by 
which governmental restriction on those rights can be meas-
ured. The standard adopted in Bagley appears to be a work-
able formula. Any such standard should weigh heavily in 
favor of the individual, and his rights should be considered 
absolute insofar as it is possible to do so. Although Justice 
Black might argue that this is still a balancing, which is 
forbidden by the Constitution, the standard adopted by the 
California Supreme Court will give considerable protection 
to the public employee in the exercise of his rights. 
The standard places the burden squarely on the govern-
ment to sustain its action, and this is where the burden clearly 
ought to be, for the rights protected by the Bill of Rights are 
guaranteed to the individual. The starting point for all 
discussion of these rights is that they exist, they belong to 
the individual, and they are protected by the Constitution. 
When the government contends that it must infringe upon 
these rights to protect its interests, the government ought to 
have the burden of proving the necessity for such infringe-
ment. What must the government show in order to discharge 
this burden under the Bagley standard? The government first 
must show "that the political restraints rationally relate to 
the enhancement of the public service. ."10 Any re-
straint that is not rationally related to the benefit to be gained 
by the government would, of course, be arbitrary and violate 
the fundamental due process standard that has been the basis 
of many United States Supreme Court decisions.ll 
Next it must show "that the benefits which the public 
gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting impairment of 
9. See e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar 
of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 6 L.Ed.2d 105, 
81 S.Ct. 997 (1961); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 25 L.Ed. 
244 (1878). 
10. 65 Cal.2d at 501, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
at 403, 421 P.2d at 411 (1966). 
11. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U.S. 183, 97 L.Ed. 216, 73 S.Ct. 215 
(1952). 
CAL LAW 1967 341 
5
Leahy: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967
Constitutional Law 
constitutional rights. "12 If weighing we must do, 
then certainly in order to tip the scales in favor of the govern-
ment the benefits to the public must outweigh the detriment 
to the individual. While the standard adopted does not indi-
cate precisely to what extent the public gain must outweigh 
the individual's detriment, the opinion uses such language as 
"manifestly outweighs"13 and "compelling public interest.,,14 
Finally, the government must show that "no alternatives 
less subversive of constitutional rights are available."15 That 
this criterion should be part of any standard that attempts 
to define the limits on government action against its employ-
ees follows again from the adoption of the basic premise 
that public employment does not deprive the employee of 
his constitutional rights. By starting from this point, it is 
incumbent on the government to devise means of reaching 
the result it desires by searching out and evaluating all avail-
able alternatives before adopting any regulations that infringe 
on the employee's rights. Once it adopts a restriction, the 
government should bear the responsibility of showing that 
there are no less restrictive alternatives that would accomplish 
the desired result. 
The standard enunciated in the Bagley case, and affirmed 
in Rosenfield, speaks of "political restraints," since these two 
cases involve the exercise of an individual's right to engage 
in political activity. It would appear, however, that the court 
was concerned not only with government restriction on polit-
ical activities as involved in Bagley and Rosenfield, but also 
with government infringement on other constitutional rights. 
Several cases illustrating this conclusion will be discussed. 
FIRST AMENDMENT-"Filthy Speech" Banned on Campus 
That the Bagley test will apply in other areas is borne out 
by its application in Goldberg v. Regents of University of 
12. 65 Cal.2d at 501-502, 55 Cal. 14. 65 Cal.2d at 507, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 403, 421 P.2d at 411 (1966). at 408, 421 P.2d at 415. 
13. 65 Cal.2d at 506, 55 Cal. Rptr. 15. 65 Cal.2d at 502, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
at 407, 421 P.2d at 415. at 403, 421 P.2d at 411. 
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California.1s Several students had been suspended and dis-
missed for participating in the so-called filthy speech rallies 
on the Berkeley campus of the University of California. Pro-
testing the arrest of a nonstudent who had displayed a sign 
on the campus containing a "filthy" word, the students in-
volved had used the same "filthy" word, as well as other lan-
guage generally not acceptable as conversation in polite 
society. After disciplinary action had been taken against the 
students following a hearing before a special ad hoc committee 
at the university, the students sought a writ of mandate to 
compel their reinstatement to the university. They contended 
that the action of the university was an unconstitutional limi-
tation on their First Amendment rights, that the regulation 
was unconstitutionally vague, and that they had been denied 
procedural process. The superior court entered a judgment 
dismissing the petition. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeal 
for the First District, the decision was affirmed. 
The significance of the decision lies in Justice Taylor's 
approach to the problem. He pointed out that whether attend-
ance at publicly financed institutions of higher education is a 
right or privilege is of no import. What is important is the 
determination that attendance at such an institution is of great 
value to the individual, and should be regarded as a benefit 
somewhat analogous to that of public employment. A Bagley-
type standard is therefore the appropriate standard for the 
analysis of students' rights. Goldberg does not state the test 
as clearly as does the Bagley case, and although Justice Taylor 
does a good job of deciding the Goldberg case within the 
framework of the test he enunciates, it would appear that 
the Bagley test is more specific and would require the court 
to make a more searching inquiry into the relative merits of 
the restrictions on the individual's rights.17 
16. 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 57 Cal. man from a city fire department. The 
Rptr. 463 (1967). city, acting under its personnel rules and 
17. Mention should also be made of regulations, suspended the fireman for 
Belshaw v. City of Berkeley, 246 Cal. writing a letter to the local newspaper 
App.2d 493, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966). concerning salary differences between 
In this case, the appellate court upheld firemen and policemen. The court held 
a lower court writ of mandamus that that the comments made by the plain-
vacated a 30-day suspension of a fire- tiff represented nothing more than an 
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FOURTH AMENDMENT-Receipt of Welfare Benefits 
Cannot Be Conditioned on Waiver of Rights 
The California Supreme Court applied the Bagley test in 
Parrish v. Civil Service Commission18 to determine whether 
the receipt of welfare benefits may be conditioned on a waiver 
of rights embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In November, 
1962, the Board of Supervisors of Alameda County ordered 
the county welfare director to initiate a series of unannounced 
early morning searches of the homes of welfare recipients 
for the purpose of detecting the presence of unauthorized 
males. Because they lacked experience in this type of investi-
gation, the social workers involved received special instruc-
tions. They were to work in pairs, one member surveying 
the back door while the recipient's own social worker pre-
sented himself at the front door and sought admittance. Once 
inside, he would proceed to the rear door and admit his com-
panion. Together the two would conduct a thorough search 
of the entire dwelling, giving particular attention to beds, 
closets, bathrooms, and other possible places of concealment. 
No search warrants were obtained, nor were any probable 
cause criteria used to establish which homes were to be 
searched. The majority of homes searched were under no 
suspicion whatever. Parrish was one of the social workers 
chosen to participate in the first wave of raids. He submitted 
a letter to his superiors declaring that he would not participate 
because of his conviction that such searches were illegal. He 
was thereafter discharged for insubordination. 
The court decided that the Bagley test was the appropriate 
one, for it applies whenever "the conditions annexed to the 
enjoyment of a public-conferred benefit require a waiver of 
rights secured by the Constitution. . . ."19 The court then 
found that these searches did not meet the third part of the 
exercise of his constitutionally protected 
right of free speech, for which, in the 
absence of a showing that his conduct 
impaired the public service, he could 
not properly be punished. (246 Cal. 
App.2d at 498.) The court did not have 
the benefit of the Bagley case on 
344 CAL LAW 1967 
which to base its decision, but did take 
its cue from the Fort case. 
18. 66 Ca1.2d 260, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 
425 P.2d 223 (1967). 
19. 66 Cal.2d at 271, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 
630, 425 P.2d at 230. 
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Bagley test because the county chose not only to search homes 
where fraud was suspected, but also homes where fraud was 
not suspected. The court concluded that any benefit to the 
county by indiscriminate searches was speculative at best and 
must yield to the right of innocent persons to be secure in 
their homes. Alternative methods were available to the 
county to search out fraud in the welfare program. Having 
applied the Bagley test to determine that the unannounced 
searches of the unsuspicious homes of welfare recipients were 
invalid, the court next held that the county could not dis-
charge a welfare worker for refusal to participate in these 
searches where the reason for his refusal was that he thought 
that they were illegal. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-Due Process: To Wear 
a Beard Is Liberty 
The Court of Appeal for the Second District also applied 
the Bagley test to uphold the nonpolitical right of a high 
school teacher to wear a beard. In Finot v. Pasadena City 
Board of Education ,20 a teacher was transferred to home 
teaching because, contrary to administrative policy, he in-
sisted on wearing a beard. Believing that there was correla-
tion between a student's appearance and his behavior, school 
authorities contended that if a teacher were to wear a beard, 
the male students would be encouraged to imitate him. With 
a writ of mandamus, the teacher tried to force the school 
authorities to reassign him to classroom teaching. The writ 
was denied in the superior court, but the Court of Appeal 
reversed, holding that the teacher was denied due process of 
law. It found that wearing a beard was not a privilege, 
that it was not within the purview of the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee to be secure in one's person, and that the ban on 
beards was not a denial of equal protection. The due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, was found 
to give a teacher the right to wear a beard. It was "one of 
20. 250 Ca1. App.2d 189, 58 Ca1. 
Rptr. 520 (1967). 
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[those] constitutionally unnamed but constitutionally pro-
tected personal liberties."l 
After determining that a constitutional right was involved, 
the next problem was to determine to what extent the govern-
ment (school authorities) could infringe on it as a condition 
for teaching in the public schools. For an answer to this 
question the court turned to Bagley and the three-part stand-
ard enunciated there. As to the first part, the court pointed 
out that "as a matter of actual experience,"2 there was no 
showing that wearing the beard disrupted or impaired class-
room discipline; it was merely the opinion of the principal 
that the beard would render the rule against student beards 
more difficult to enforce. The court, however, agreed that 
this was a rational basis for the rule; therefore, part one of 
the test was satisfied. However, the benefit to the public 
did not outweigh the impairment of the individual rights, and 
reasonable alternatives were available. The restriction on 
teachers wearing beards, therefore, violated due process.3 
FIRST AMENDMENT-Obscenity: What Is It? 
This First Amendment problem arose in Landau v. Fording. 4 
The trial court found "Un Chant d'Amour," a film written 
and directed by Jean Genet, depicting acts of sexual perver-
sion in a prison, to be obscene within the meaning of Penal 
Code section 311 (a).5 The Court of Appeal affirmed a 
1. 250 Cal. App.2d at 198, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. at 526. 
2. 250 Cal. App.2d at 200, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. at 527. 
3. 250 Cal. App.2d at 201, 58 Cal. 
Rp:r. at 528. 
4. 245 Cal. App.2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
177 (1966), afJ'd mem., 388 U.S. 456, 
18 L.Ed.2d 1317, 87 S.Ct. 2109 (1967); 
the dicta implying that "pandering" is a 
part of the offense proscribed by Penal 
Code § 311.2 was specifically overruled 
in People v. Noroff, 67 Cal.2d -, 63 
Cal. Rptr. 575, 433 P.2d 479 (1967). 
The court in NorofJ stated that Penal 
Code § 311.2 does not apply to matters 
346 CAL LAW 1967 
produced solely for the personal enjoy-
ment of the creator or as a means for 
the improvement of his artistic tech-
nique. But the discussion above on the 
standard of obscenity still seems ap-
plicable. 
5. Section 311(a) of the California 
Penal Code reads as follows: 
"Obscene" means that to the average 
person, applying contemporary stand-
ards, the predominant appeal of the 
matter, taken as a whole, is to pruri-
ent interest, i.e., a shameful or mor-
bid interest in nudity, sex, or excre-
tion, which goes substantially beyond 
customary limits of candor in descrip-
tion or representation of such matters 
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lower court's ruling that since a film was obscene within the 
statutory definition, any showing of it would be in violation 
of the Penal Code. 
The statutory definition had been amended in 1961 to 
conform to the United States Supreme Court's mandate in 
Roth v. United States. 6 The test of obscenity laid down in 
Roth is "whether to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant theme of the mate-
rial taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."7 A com-
parison of the Roth test with the definition contained in the 
Penal Code indicates that they are not identical. Even assum-
ing, however, that the Penal Code definition does meet the 
Roth test, three Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
have, since Roth, restated the test in more specific terms. In 
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,S the test was 
restated to include the establishment of three standards that 
must all be met: 
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a 
whole [must appeal] to a prurient interest in sex; (b) 
the material [must be] patently offensive because it 
affronts contemporary community standards relating to 
the description or representation of sexual matters; and 
(c) the material [must be] utterly without redeeming 
social value.9 
Comparing this test with the Roth test, significant change 
is evident. lO The Roth test requires only that the material 
have a dominant theme that appeals to prurient interests 
when viewed in the context of contemporary community stand-
ards. Neither the criterion of "patently offensive" nor of 
and is matter which is utterly without 
redeeming social importance. 
6. 354 U.S. 476, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 77 
S.Ct. 1304 (1957). 
7. 354 U.S. at 489, 1 L.Ed.2d at 
1509, 77 S.Ct. at 1311. 
8. 383 U.S. 413, 16 L.Ed.2d 1, 86 
S.Ct. 975 (1966). 
9. 383 U.S. at 418, 16 L.Ed.2d at 6, 
86 S.Ct. at 977. 
10. It must be pointed out, however, 
that only three Justices-Warren, Bren-
nan, and Fortas-joined in the Memoirs 
opinion. 
CAL LAW 1967 347 
11
Leahy: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967
Constitutional Law 
"utterly without redeeming social value," as required by 
Memoirs, enters into the Roth test. ll Regardless of the back-
ground on which the Memoirs test is founded, there are three 
parts to the test, and material alleged to be obscene must 
be measured against all three parts. 
Returning to the Landau case, it is apparent that while 
Justice Taylor refers to the Memoirs case, he does not apply 
the three-part test, but applies the Roth test as codified in the 
Penal Code. Justice Taylor then tests the film against the 
"social importance" provision in the statute and concludes: 
"[I]n our opinion, the production does nothing more than 
depict a number of disjointed scenes treating sex in a shock-
ing, morbid and shameful manner and is devoid of artistic 
merit.»l2 To bolster its conclusion that the film was objec-
tionable, the court used the approach approved in Ginzburg 
v. United States,13 and found that the film had been commer-
cially exploited, with substantial sums of money being earned 
by its showing. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the 
Landau case and, in a per curiam decision, affirmed the deci-
sion of the California appellate court. Although Justices 
Warren, Brennan, Clark, Harlan, and White voted to affirm, 
Justices Black, Douglas, Stewart, and Fortas would have 
reversed. While one can only speculate as to why the Justices 
voted as they did in affirming the Landau case, one does won-
der about the positions of Justices Warren and Brennan. The 
appellate court did not apply the three-part test that was 
approved by Justices Warren, Brennan, and Fortas in 
Memoirs. Completely absent from the Penal Code and from 
Justice Taylor's opinion is any reference to part (b) of the 
Memoirs test, that is, whether the material was "patently 
offensive." Justice Fortas voted to reverse the Landau case, 
11. Even in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, 84 S.Ct. 
1676 (1964), although Justice Brennan 
stated that "obscenity is excluded from 
the constitutional protection only be-
cause it is 'utterly without redeeming 
social value,''' he does not explicitly 
348 CAL LAW 1967 
amend the Roth test. No indication is 
given where the "patently offensive" 
part of the test arose. 
12. 245 Cal. App.2d at 829, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 183. 
13. 383 U.S. 463, 16 L.Ed.2d 31, 86 
S.Ct. 942 (1966). 
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and it may be that he concluded that neither the Penal Code 
nor Justice Taylor's opinion correctly states the Memoirs test. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS-Gen-
erally 
One of the basic tenets of constitutional law is: 
[T]he courts will not nullify laws enacted under the police 
power unless they are manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary 
or capricious, having no real or substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals or general welfare.14 
On several occasions this past year, claims of manifest un-
reasonableness were rejected by the California courts. The 
courts found valid as against this attack a charge by a city 
of 2 cents per ton for each ton hauled by trucks weighing 
27,000 pounds or over;15 price maintenance provisions of the 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act;16 and the prohibition against 
physicians and surgeons having any proprietary interest in a 
pharmacy.17 The basic position taken was that it was for 
the legislature to make such decisions, even though it might 
be debatable whether a statute really satisfies a public need. 
The Supreme Court of California dealt also with several 
other specific due process problems. In People v. United 
National Insurance Co./8 it upheld state regulation of the 
insurance transactions of foreign insurance companies having 
no agents or offices in California, but doing business in Cali-
fornia with California residents exclusively by mail. The 
14. Ratkovich v. City of San Bruno, 
245 Cal. App.2d at 879, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
at 338-339. See also Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 10 L.Ed.2d 93, 
83 S.Ct. 1028, 95 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1963); 
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 85 
L.Ed. 1305, 61 S.Ct. 862, 133 A.L.R. 
1500 (1941). 
15. Ratkovich v. City of San Bruno, 
245 Cal. App.2d 870, 54 Cal. Rptr. 333 
(1966). See discussion in McKinstry, 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, in this 
volume. 
16. 36 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§§ 24749-24757; Wilke & Holzheiser, 
Inc. v. Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 
65 Cal.2d 349, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 420 
P.2d 735 (1966). 
17. Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. St. Bd. 
of Med. Examiners, 249 Cal. App.2d 
124, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1967). See 
Brandel, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, in this 
volume. 
18. 66 Cal.2d 577, 58 Cal. Rptr. 599, 
427 P.2d 199 (1967), appeal dismissed, 
- U.S. -, 19 L.Ed.2d 562, 88 S.Ct. 
506 (1967). 
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Insurance Commissioner sought to enjoin three foreign insur-
ance companies from carrying on their mail order business 
until they complied with section 700 of the Insurance Code 
and obtained a certificate of authority. Two of the companies 
mailed application forms to prospective purchasers. When 
these forms were completed and returned to the companies, 
policies were issued at the home offices and sent to the appli-
cants. The third company sent a pre-endorsed policy to the 
California resident, together with an application. When the 
applicant returned the application and the first premium, the 
policy became effective. 
The court recognized that, in the McCarran Act,19 Congress 
had conferred on the states the authority to regulate and 
tax the business of insurance, even though the United States 
Supreme Court had earlier held that such business was inter-
state commerce. But since state regulation is nevertheless sub-
ject to due process, the court had to look to pre-McCarran 
decisions for guidelines of due process in this type of case. 
It isolated two separate yet consistent trends of decision. The 
first is exemplified by a trilogy of cases20 that emphasized the 
place of making a contract sought to be taxed or regulated, 
and held that if the activities relevant to the making and 
carrying out of such a contract occurred outside the taxing 
or regulating state, an attempt to tax or regulate it would 
be in violation of due process. The second trend is exemplified 
by two later cases that laid emphasis on the contacts1 with 
the regulating state arising from the transactions involved 
and the interest of the state in these transactions. The latter 
trend indicates that if a state has sufficient interests and 
contacts, regulation of the transactions does not violate due 
process. 
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. 
20. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. John-
son, 303 U.S. 77, 82 L.Ed. 673, 58 S.Ct. 
436 (1938); St. Louis Cotton Compress 
Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 67 L.Ed. 
297, 43 S.Ct. 125 (1922); Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 41 L.Ed. 832, 
17 S.Ct. 427 (1897). 
3.$0 CAL LAW 1967 
1. See Hoopeston Canning Co. v. 
Cullin, 318 U.S. at 319,87 L.Ed. at 783, 
63 S.Ct. at 606, 145 A.L.R. at 1119 
(1943); Osborn v. OzIin, 310 U.S. 53, 
84 L.Ed. 1074, 60 S.Ct. 758 (1940). 
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In United National the court used the reasoning of the 
second trend and held that the interests of, and the contacts 
with, the state arising from a mail order business were suf-
ficient to give California a substantial interest in the trans-
actions. The transactions, therefore, do not violate the due 
process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the 
decision is in accord with a recent Wisconsin case,2 which 
was also dismissed on appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court for want of a substantial federal question. 
This writer submits that the decision of the California 
court is not even in conflict with the United States Supreme 
Court decisions representing the first trend, since these cases 
dealt with either the state's power to tax or the imposition 
of criminal sanctions, and not with the state's power to 
regulate. The power to regulate falls within the police power 
of the state and should not depend on a technical determi-
nation of where a contract is made, but rather on the sum 
total of the facts leading up to the eventual placing of the 
insurance in force. 3 
The due process issue was again raised in In re Halko.4 
In a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus, the court upheld 
the right of the state to quarantine a person with a contagious 
and infectious disease for an indefinite period, provided that 
there is reasonable cause to suspect that a threat to public 
health and safety exists. 
The petitioner had been found to have active pulmonary 
tuberculosis and had been confined to a hospital after being 
served with a quarantine order of isolation. Petitioner de-
serted the hospital and was later convicted of violating section 
3351 of the Health and Safety Code. While in jail, petitioner 
was again served with an order of isolation because of his 
tuberculosis, and was returned to the hospital. By successive 
isolation orders, served at 6-month intervals, the petitioner 
was confined to the hospital for approximately 18 months. 
2. Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. 
Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 
(1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 205, 
17 L.Ed.2d 301, 87 S.Ct. 407 (1966). 
3. See Hoopeston Canning Co. v. 
Cullin, 318 U.S. at 319, 87 L.Ed. at 
783, 63 S. Ct. at 606, 145 A.L.R. at 
1119 (1943). 
4. 246 Cal. App.2d 553, 54 Cal Rptr. 
661 (1966). 
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Halko contended that these consecutive orders of quarantine 
and isolation, issued "without means of questioning and judi-
cially determining" the conclusion of the health officer, re-
sulted in "continually depriving one of his liberty," and that 
therefore, section 3285 "is unconstitutional in that it deprives 
this petitioner of his liberty without due process of law."5 
The court sustained the right of the state under its police 
power to protect the health and safety of its citizens. The 
court pointed out that the legislature is given broad discretion 
in determining what measures are necessary for the protection 
of such interests, the determination of which diseases are 
infectious and contagious, and the adoption of appropriate 
measures for preventing their spread.6 
While this decision follows prevailing law,7 the petitioner 
did raise the due process question, whether the discretionary 
decision of the health officer should not at some time be sub-
ject to judicial review.s Since it appears from the decision 
that a person quarantined in California can secure such a 
judicial review by using a writ of habeas corpus, the due proc-
ess requirement is satisfied. 
During the past year, the Court of Appeal added another 
case to the growing list of cases that authorize summary sus-
pension of licenses before the licensee is given a hearing. 
In Stewart v. County of San Mateo/ the licensee had a permit 
to operate a private patrol service within the county. This 
permit was summarily revoked by the sheriff.lO In an action 
for declaratory judgment that the ordinance under which his 
permit had been revoked was invalid, the revocation was up-
held. The general rule in California has been: 
5. 246 Cal. App.2d at 554, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 662. 
6. 246 Cal. App.2d at 557, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 663. 
7. 25 AM JUR, Health (1st ed § 38 
at 315). 
8. See Note, Due Process for All-
Constitutional Standards for Involuntary 
Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. 
OF CHI. L. REV. 663 (1967). 
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9. 246 Cal. App.2d 273, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
599 (1966). 
10. San Mateo City Ord. Code 
§ 5620.8 provides in part: "The sheriff 
shall revoke any permit issued here-
under when in his opinion the permittee 
is violating any of the provisions of this 
chapter or of the Private Investigator 
and Adjuster Act." 
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[B]ecause of reasons of justice and policy, a statute, 
unless it expressly provides to the contrary, will be inter-
preted to require a hearing in license revocation pro-
ceedings where it contemplates a quasi-judicial determi-
nation by the administrative agency that there be cause 
for the revocation. ll 
The California Supreme Court, however, has held that 
due process is not violated by a summary suspension or revo-
cation of a license where the action of the administrative 
agency is then subject to judicial review. This summary pro-
cedure, when justified by a compelling public interest, is 
consistent with the position of the United States Supreme 
Court.12 In Stewart, the court, recognizing that the right to 
engage in legitimate employment is an individual freedom 
secured by the due process clauses of the Federal and State 
Constitutions, concluded that the public interest is served 
by the summary procedure as long as the licensee may secure 
a hearing by appeal to the board. It said, "We are persuaded 
that because the role of a private patrol officer is akin to that 
of peace officers, it bears a sensitive relationship to the public 
interest."13 Although the court did not expressly say so, it 
implied that the hearing accorded the licensee by the board 
was one in which the licensee was allowed to present evidence 
in opposition to the revocation of his license. 
But if due process requires that a person be given a hearing 
before some action can be taken against him, does it require 
that the hearing must be before the agency that takes the 
action? This unusual question arose in the case of O'Reilly 
v. Board of Medical Examiners.14 The petitioner, O'Reilly, 
was a licensed osteopath and therefore subject to control 
by the Board of Osteopathic Examiners. Charges were filed 
with the board against him, alleging that he had violated sec-
11. 246 Cal. App.2d at 283, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 605. 
12. Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 
U.S. 183, 81 L.Ed. 1027, 57 S.Ct. 691 
(1937). See also Note, Automobiles: 
Constitutionality of Safety Responsibil-
ity Laws, 39 CAL. L. REV. 123 (1951). 
23 
13. 246 Cal. App.2d at 288, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 608. 
14. 66 CaI.2d 381, 58 Cal. Rptr. 7, 
426 P.2d 167 (1967). 
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tion 2392 of the Business and Professions Code.15 An ap-
pointed hearing officer, after holding a hearing in accordance 
with the statutory requirements/a recommended disciplinary 
action against the petitioner. In the interim, the petitioner 
elected to be licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners, 
and he was granted a physician's and surgeon's certificate. 
Shortly thereafter, the Board of Medical Examiners ratified 
the proceedings that had taken place before the Board of 
Osteopathic Examiners and adopted the decision of the hear-
ing officer. No additional hearing had been given to the 
petitioner. The lower court and the Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners, and held 
that there had been no violation of due process in this proce-
dure. As a basis for its decision, the Supreme Court stated, 
"due process is not interested in mere technical formalism. 
It is the substance that is determinative of whether due process 
has been afforded. "17 
The fact that neither the Board of Osteopathic Examiners 
nor the Board of Medical Examiners heard the evidence was 
not fataI,18 The board that decides the matter, however, 
must itself consider the evidence presented to the hearing offi-
cer. As long as the board makes the final decision after an 
independent review of the record, it is not precluded from 
adopting the hearing officer's recommendation. Thus it would 
appear that the California Supreme Court's answer in the 
O'Reilly case is correct. 
Right v. Privilege-Attendance at State Institutions of Higher 
Learning 
In Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California/9 
the question whether an interest is a right or privilege was 
15. This section prohibits the employ-
ment of an unlicensed practitioner in 
the practice of any system or mode of 
treating the sick or afflicted. 
16. Cal. Gov't. Code, §§ 11503, 
11505 and 11509. 
17. 66 Cal.2d at 384, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
at 9, 428 P.2d at 606. 
354 CAL LAW 1967 
18. See Morgan v. United States, 298 
U.S. 468, 80 L.Ed. 1288, 56 S.Ct. 906 
(1936); Cooper v. State Ed. of Med. 
Examiners, 35 Cal.2d 242, 217 P.2d 
630, 18 A.L.R.2d 593 (1950). 
19. 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 463 (1967). 
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held not to be determinative of whether a hearing is neces-
sary before an interest can be restricted. This approach more 
accurately reflects the true spirit of due process than the 
classification of interests as privileges or rights. Due process 
is concerned with justice and fair play, which require that 
when the government seeks to revoke or restrict an interest 
of an individual, the individual should have an opportunity to 
be heard before the action becomes final. There may be 
times when the interest of the public requires that the action 
be taken first, but as indicated in the cases reviewed above, 
where the action depends upon factual determinations, the 
individual should be allowed to participate in the ultimate 
determination of those facts. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS-Taxa-
tion: "In Flight" Time Is Taxable 
A due process question of first impression in California, 
and one involving an area in which the United States Supreme 
Court has not yet spoken, was dealt with in Zan top Air 
Transport v. County of San Bernardino.20 The question 
concerned the use of "in flight" time in an apportionment 
formula used to levy an ad valorem property tax on the plain-
tiff's flight equipment. 
The plaintiff was an airline company based in Detroit, 
Michigan, but operating aircraft in and out of and within 
California. The county tax assessor had devised a formula 
to tax the flight equipment, which included not only the 
ground time in the county but also time "in flight" within 
California, when the planes were coming into and leaving the 
state. The assessor had also used one-half of the "in flight" 
time for flights between bases within the state. The plaintiffs 
conceded that under Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State 
Board of Equalization, l their aircraft were subject to an ad 
20. 246 Cal. App.2d 433, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 813 (1966). 
1. 347 U.S. 590, 98 L.Ed. 967, 74 
S.Ct. 757 (1954). Braniff's home base 
was in Minnesota. It had 18 scheduled 
stops in Nebraska, all of short dura-
tion. It had hired depot space and 
services as business required, but had 
no storage or repair facilities. A Ne-
braska statute imposed an ad valorem 
property tax on the flight equipment of 
all regularly scheduled planes, appor-
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valorem property tax on a properly apportioned basis. How-
ever, neither Braniff nor any other United States Supreme 
Court or California appellate court case had considered "in 
flight" time in an apportionment formula. 
There should be no constitutional defect in the allocation 
formula used in the instant case. The three factors that have 
influenced the United States Supreme Court in taxation appor-
tionment cases have been: (1) whether the property has ac-
quired a taxable situs elsewhere;2 (2) whether the tax in 
practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or 
protection conferred or afforded by the state; and (3) whether 
the tax constitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate 
commerce.s 
These tests were met in the Zan top case. No other state 
could tax the "in flight" time in California, and the airline 
did enjoy benefits and protections from the county, not only 
while on the ground but during flight over the land subject 
to the jurisdiction of the taxing authority. Further, the tax 
did not appear to be an unreasonable burden on interstate 
commerce. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTEC· 
TION-Apportionment: Irrigation Districts Do Not 
Govern 
The equal protection clause also received its share of atten-
tion this year. Such diverse problems as reapportionment, 
taxation, and liability for the care of mental patients came 
under scrutiny. 
tioned by a formula having three ratios: 
(1) ratio of arrivals and departures to 
that of the previous year; (2) ratio of 
revenue tons handled at state airports 
to that of all airports; and (3) ratio 
of revenue collected within the state to 
total revenue for the same period. The 
Supreme Court held that the situs issue 
devolves into whether 18 stops per day 
is sufficient contact with Nebraska to 
sustain that state's power to levy an ap-
portioned ad valorem tax, and said that 
the basis of jurisdiction is the habitual 
356 CAL LAW 1967 
employment of the property within the 
state. Nebraska affords protection dur-
ing such stops, and these regular land-
ings were clearly a benefit to appellant. 
The court, therefore, held that Nebraska 
had sufficient contact to impose the tax. 
2. See Northwest Airlines v. Minne-
sota, 322 U.S. 292, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 64 
S.Ct. 950, 153 A.L.R. 245 (1944). 
3. See Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge 
Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 93 L.Ed. 585, 
69 S.Ct. 432 (1949). 
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The California Court of Appeal for the Fifth District, in 
Thompson v. Board of Directors,4 had to plow new ground 
to reach a decision on the question of the reapportionment 
of an irrigation district. The district is governed by a board 
consisting of five members, and is divided into five divisions; 
one director is elected from each division. These divisions 
had not been modified for over 30 years. 
The respondents had unsuccessfully petitioned the appel-
lant Board of Directors to redraw the division lines so that 
there would be less disparity in the distribution of the popu-
lation among the five divisions. They then petitioned the 
Superior Court of Stanislaus County to do so. The trial judge 
granted judgment for respondents and issued a writ of man-
date directing the redrawing of boundary lines. The irriga-
tion district appealed from this order. Although the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court required the reapportionment of county 
supervisorial districts5 2 years ago, it has not yet spoken on 
the question of apportionment of special districts such as the 
one involved in this case. Nor could the Court of Appeal 
find help from the United States Supreme Court, where the 
apportionment cases have all been concerned with either state 
legislative or congressional reapportionment. 6 
Operating in this vacuum, the court devised a test of its 
own: 
[1]f the principal purpose of a district is to provide a 
service or services which can be and are sometimes pro-
vided by a private or quasi-public corporation (such as 
a public utility company), and if in the accomplishment 
of this purpose it does not exercise general powers of 
government, it is not subject to the "one man, one vote" 
4. 247 Cal. App.2d 587, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
689 (1967). 
5. Wiltse v. Board of Supervisors, 65 
Cal.2d 314, 54 Cal. Rptr. 320, 419 P.2d 
440 (1966); Miller v. Board of Super-
visors, 63 Cal.2d 343, 46 Cal. Rptr. 
617, 405 P.2d 857 (1965). 
6. The cases of Sailors v. Board of 
Ed., 387 U.S. 105, 18 L.Ed.2d 650, 87 
S.Ct. 1549 (1967), involving a county 
school board, and Dusch v. Davis, 387 
U.S. 112, 18 L.Ed.2d 656, 87 S.Ct. 
1554 (1967), involving an election of 
city councilmen, did not require the 
United States Supreme Court to state 
whether the "one man, one vote" doc-
trine extended below the legislative 
level. 
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rule. If, however, its principal purpose is to govern or 
if its functions are primarily governmental in nature, or 
if not governmental in nature they are accomplished 
by the exercise of general powers of government, it meets 
the test, and the doctrine is applicable.7 
Applying this test to an irrigation district, the court concluded 
that the district fell within the first part of the test and there-
fore was not subject to the "one man, one vote" requirement. 8 
While it can be suggested that since irrigation districts 
are creatures of the legislature, they should properly be appor-
tioned, it appears that the test devised by the Court of Appeal 
is a reasonable one. The test is somewhat broader than a 
mere search for an answer to the question whether the body 
is performing a legislative function. Although the court does 
not give explicit guidelines for determining whether a ~ody's 
"principal purpose is to govern," it is possible that some spe-
cial bodies, which do not have legislative powers, may be said 
to perform other governmental functions. Thus the courts 
that adopt this test will have to decide whether to reapportion 
a body that assesses, levies, or collects taxes; grants a fran-
chise; or provides such services as fire protection, police pro-
tection, or maintenance of park and recreational areas. 
EQUAL PROTECTION-Taxation 
The Estate of Rogers9 raised an interesting equal protection 
problem in a taxation case. The taxpayer was required to 
pay an inheritance tax on one-half the value of joint tenancy 
property, the purchase price of which came from quasi-
community property. The husband and wife had come to 
California from Ohio in 1955, bringing with them certain 
7. 247 Cal. App.2d at 592, 55 Cal. 9. 245 Cal. App.2d 101, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 692. 572 (1966). Although this decision is 
8. Although the population criterion dated Sept. 21, 1966, it has been in-
was not unconstitutional, the board's eluded in the survey because the deci-
abuse of discretion justified the trial sion was modified on Oct. 13, 1966, 
court's action requiring it to change before it became final. See Estate of 
boundaries. See also McKinstry, STATE Rogers, 53 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1966) for 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, in this vol- modification. 
ume. 
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funds that represented the husband's earnings prior to their 
move. These funds, although conceded to be the husband's 
separate property, became quasi-community property after 
the couple settled in this state. The husband used the funds 
to purchase various parcels of real estate, taking the title in 
joint tenancy with his wife. She had not furnished any part 
of the consideration for these purchases. The wife died in 
1964, and the husband petitioned the superior court to estab-
lish the fact of the wife's death and to determine whether 
any inheritance tax was payable. 
The superior court found that section 13672 of the Revenue 
and Taxation Code, which controlled this factual situation, 
violated the equal protection clauses of the California and 
the United States Constitutions. The Court of Appeal dis-
agreed. Section 13672 states in essence that where joint 
tenancy property is purchased from quasi-community property 
funds, one-half the value of the property shall be taxed 
in the estate of the first joint tenant to die, as if that joint 
tenant had contributed one-half of the consideration for the 
purchase thereof. 
This in itself raised no constitutional question, but such a 
question is raised when one considers that section 13671 of 
the same code, which relates to joint tenancies generally, 
allows the surviving joint tenant to prove that the deceased 
did not contribute any part of the consideration for the 
acquisition of the joint tenancy.l0 When he does so, no tax 
is levied. Further, under section 13671.5, [i]f a husband and 
wife place community property in their joint names, the joint 
tenancy shall be treated as if it were community property.ll 
As community property, the interest of the deceased joint 
tenant spouse is not subject to being taxed.12 
In reaching its decision in Rogers, the appellate court 
seemed to place emphasis on the fact that the legislature 
"attempted, in certain areas, to assimilate the rights of the 
~ nonacquiring spouse in property acquired during a marriage 
10. 245 Cal. App.2d at 104, 53 Cal. 11. 245 Cal. App.2d at 104, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. at 574. Rptr. at 574. 
12. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 13551. 
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elsewhere to the rights of California domiciliaries."13 The 
court reasoned that because the legislature had tried to give 
quasi-community property owners the same benefits as com-
munity owners, the taxpayer here should not complain because 
he has not received any such benefits from this legislation. 
However, the court overlooked the fact that what had been 
taxed was an interest in joint tenancy property that passed 
from the deceased to the survivor, and, no matter what the 
source of the funds, the survivor received that interest from 
the decedent by operation of law. The interest that passed 
to the survivor is the same interest, whether the funds were 
from separate property, community property, or quasi-commu-
nity property. The legislature has exempted from taxation 
that interest in two of these three situations, as pointed out 
above. Section 13672, therefore, is construed to treat this 
surviving joint tenant differently from the other surviving 
joint tenants, yet there is no showing of any rational basis 
for this different treatment. 
In another taxation case, Willingham Bus Lines, Inc. v. 
Municipal Court,l4 a charter bus company found no relief 
from the Supreme Court. At issue was a tax that is levied 
by the City of San Diego on the business of furnishing charter 
buses for hire. The tax was based on the gross receipts 
received by the bus operator, adjusted to the mileage the 
buses run in the city. Taxicabs, sightseeing buses, autos for 
hire, all paid a flat license fee, as did charter boats, sight-
seeing boats, and charter airplanes. 
The taxpayer had contended that this classification violated 
the equal protection clause, and the Court of Appeal agreed. 
That court stated: 
We are unable to draw a distinction with relevant differ-
ence between appellant and the other closely related 
passenger-carrying businesses enumerated in the ordi-
nance and taxed on a different basis.15 
13. 245 Cal. App.2d at 109, 53 Cal. 15. 248 A.C.A. I, 5, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 577. at 94 (1967). 
14. 66 Cal.2d 893, 59 Cal. Rptr. 618, 
428 P.2d 602 (1967). 
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This argument did not impress the Supreme Court, however, 
and because the plaintiff could not show that "these disparate 
formulae for taxation work a concrete hardship upon charter 
bus lines,»lS it had to pay the tax under the city's formulae, 
although others similarly situated paid only a flat license fee. 
In Web Service Co. v. Spencer,17 another taxpayer also 
alleged discriminatory treatment and lost. The taxpayer 
owned a number of coin-operated washing machines and 
driers, which he had located in motels, apartment houses, and 
trailer courts. On December 31, 1963, he owned 693 
machines at 261 locations. Under the Anaheim Municipal 
Code, the business of coin-operated machines, such as that 
owned by the taxpayer, was subject to a tax of $1 per 
machine annually. However, the person conducting such a 
business had the option to pay the tax based on his gross 
receipts, which were taxed on a prescribed graduated scale, 
with a minimum of $25 for each separate location. 
The city contended that the taxpayer was operating at 261 
different locations, and therefore he would be required to pay 
the minimum tax of $25 for each location if he chose to 
use the alternate, gross receipts method of paying the tax. 
The taxpayer brought a writ of mandamus to require the issu-
ance of one license to cover all of his machines. He argued 
that even though he had machines at a number of locations, 
he should be treated no differently than a laundromat operator 
who has as many as 30 machines at one location. The 
laundromat operator, by being faced with only a minimum 
tax of $25 for his location, even though having 30 or more 
machines there, was in a position to compare the gross receipts 
tax and the per machine tax, and take his choice. The tax-
payer in this case had no such choice available, because of 
the city's insistence that he pay the minimum tax of $25 for 
each location. 
The superior court agreed with the taxpayer that the inter-
pretation of the ordinance by the city discriminated against 
him and therefore violated the equal protection clause. The 
16. 66 Cal.2d at 897, 59 Cal. Rptr. 17. 252 Cal. App.2d 891, 61 Cal. 
at 621, 428 P.2d at 604. Rptr. 493 (1967). 
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Court of Appeal found otherwise. It pointed out that while 
the result will place in one classification a route operator such 
as the taxpayer in this case, and a laundromat operator in 
another, there does appear to be a reasonable basis for such 
classification. The court noted that the city council may 
have been aware that the operations of route operators and 
laundromat operators differ, and that the gross receipts com-
putation alone would not afford a basis on which to equate 
the tax burden between the two types of operations. The 
court concluded by holding that the ordinance 
meet[s] the requirement that the classification or meas-
ure of tax used shall be reasonably related to the objec-
tive of the legislation, viz., the taxable event; do[es] not 
unlawfully discriminate against the route operator; do[es] 
not impose a tax in an amount that is confiscatory or as 
a subterfuge to eliminate competition . . .18 
Thus it appears that the court did test the tax and its appli-
cation to the taxpayer against a measurable standard in finding 
that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. 
Equal protection has no meaning unless there are some stand-
ards beyond which the legislature cannot go. While equal 
protection standards may be vague and uncertain, and sub-
ject to different application by different individuals, there 
nevertheless ought to be some standards, and the courts ought 
to apply them in each case. This was done by the Court of 
Appeal in Web Service, but not by the Supreme Court in 
Willingham. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTECTION 
-Care for Patients in State Mental Institutions 
One final equal protection problem, the determination of 
the obligation of the estate of a deceased husband to pay for 
care of a wife who had previously been committed to a state 
mental institution, was presented to two courts of appeal. 
Both reached identical results. The obligation was upheld 
18. 252 Cal. App.2d at 902-903, 61 19. 246 Cal. App.2d 24, 54 Cal Rptr. 
Cal. Rptr. at 501. 432 (1966). 
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in Department of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor19 and in De-
partment of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts. 20 
Prior to 1967, section 6650 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code defined those persons obligated to pay for such care. 
It read, in part, as follows: 
The husband, wife, father, mother, or children of a 
mentally ill person. ., and the administrators of 
their estates, . shall be liable for his care, sup-
port, and maintenance in a state institution of which he 
is an inmate. The liability of such persons and estates 
shall be a joint and several liability. . . .1 
It was the contention of the representatives of the estates 
of the husbands in both cases that a prior case, Department 
of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner/ had held section 6650 to be 
unconstitutional, and that thereby no liability existed. In 
Kirchner, the Supreme Court of California held that it was 
a denial of equal protection under the California Consti-
tution3 to charge an adult child, under section 6650, with 
the cost of his parent's care while the parent was a patient 
in a state mental hospital. It was a denial of equal protection 
to select one particluar class of persons for a species of 
taxation with no rational basis to such classification. 
In both O'Connor and Kolts, the appellate courts con-
cluded that Kirchner did not hold section 6650 to be uncon-
stitutional per se, but only that classification that made the 
adult child liable for the parent's care. On this basis, then, 
the courts were able to discuss the liability of the husband 
under the statute. Both courts found the liability of the hus-
band to stand on a different footing than the liability of the 
adult child. 
20. 247 Cal. App.2d 154, 55 Cal. 2. 60 Ca1.2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 
Rptr. 437 (1966). 388 P.2d 720 (1964), vacated, 380 U.S. 
1. § 6650 was repealed, Stats. 1967, 194, 13 L.Ed.2d 753, 85 S.Ct. 871 
c. 1667, § 36.5, p. -, and replaced by (1964); reiterated on remand 62 Cal.2d 
§ 7275 of the same code. Stats. 1967, 586, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321 
c. 1667, § 40, p. -. The pertinent part (1965). 
of § 7275 is substantially the same as 3. Cal. Const., Art. I, §§ 11 and 21. 
§ 6650. 
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The court in O'Connor reached its decision by stating that 
although a husband has a legal obligation to support his wife, 
evidenced by history and statutes, there is no common-law 
basis to impose liability on a child to support his parent. 
The Kolts court took the same position, and traced the com-
mon-law liability of the husband to support the wife. While 
these cases do not raise or settle any unusual constitutional 
issues, they are worthy of note, for they limit Kirchner to 
factual situations wherein the person sought to be found 
responsible has no common-law or other statutory obligation 
to support the patient to whom the care is given. 
CONCLUSION 
In assessing the appellate courts' handling of these various 
questions, it is apparent that the constitutional rights of public 
employees were carefully preserved. 
Obscenity again underwent judicial scrutiny, but it ap-
pears that until the United States Supreme Court can agree 
upon a test for obscenity, other courts and legislatures will 
have to do the best they can with the standards previously 
enunciated. 
In the cases involving due process clauses, while some of 
the questions were novel, it appears that the appellate courts 
gave the matters fair consideration. Their decisions were 
consistent with the basic tenet that government action, when 
tested against the due process clause, must not be unreason-
able or arbitrary, and must be reasonably related to the ob-
jective sought to be accomplished by the action. 
By adopting its own test of whether the "one man, one 
vote" rule ought to apply to local government units, the 
Court of Appeal for the Fifth District steered a middle course 
between those who argue that all elected government units 
should be apportioned, and those who say that the rule should 
apply only to those units exercising legislative powers. 
When the court determines that a tax does not violate 
the equal protection clause, it should reach that conclusion 
by measuring the legislative classification againt a definite 
standard. To merely say that there need not be absolute 
3~4 CAl,. LA W 1~67 
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equality, as the Supreme Court did in Willingham, is not a 
sufficient answer to such a constitutional issue. In Willing-
ham the court upheld the tax without discussing why the 
tax was not a discriminatory classification, whereas in Web 
Service the appellate court, even though upholding the tax, 
did apply a standard and made a case for the classification. 
A reasonable classification was also found in the cases that 
raised the issue of statutory liability for care of a patient at 
a state mental institution. Here again, the classification was 
tested and found constitutionally acceptable . 
• 
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